What discretionary acts means for the immunity purposes under Gov. Code 820.2.

Gov. Code § 820.2 grants immunity to public employees for injuries resulting from discretionary decisions. The question is what constitutes "discretionary. On this question, Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 is recognized as the the leading case. See  Ogborn v. City of Lancaster 101 Cal.App.4th 448 (2002)

Johnson first addressed basic principles... e.g.,

Gov. Code § 820.2 was intended to restate the pre-existing California law, citing Sava v. Fuller 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 284,  and [according to pre-existing law] "... the Legislature has not granted immunity from liability for every act or omission following after the exercise of discretion." (Ibid. p. 285.)

And, that the 1963 Tort Claims Act alter the basic teaching of  Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., supra, 55 Cal.2d 211, 219 " (1961), that when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception."

Johnson went on to state that  courts should not casually decree governmental immunity; through a literal interpretation of "discretionary" or otherwise, [that]  820.2 should not be made a "catchall section broadly encompassing every judgment exercised at every level.... [That,] to borrow the language of Justice Frankfurter ... [would be] to make the act `self-defeating by covertly imbedding the casuistries' of some of the pre-Muskopf cases." (Sava v. Fuller, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 291.)

Johnson went on to state that  courts should not casually decree governmental immunity; through a literal interpretation of "discretionary" or otherwise, [that]  820.2 should not be made a "catchall section broadly encompassing every judgment exercised at every level.... [That,] to borrow the language of Justice Frankfurter ... [would be] to make the act `self-defeating by covertly imbedding the casuistries'of some of the pre-Muskopf cases." (Sava v. Fuller, supra, 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 291.)

Johnson further held that "to be entitled to immunity the state must make a showing that such a policy decision, [that] consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place. The fact that an employee normally engages in `discretionary activity' is irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a considered decision. 

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:

"In Barrier v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97, 13 P.3d 704, this court rejected a request by 59 California cities and towns that we reconsider and overrule our 1968 decision in Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352. We observed in Barner that the principles set forth in Johnson reflected more than three decades of authoritative precedent, and that the Legislature during that time had made no changes to the governmental immunity provision of section 820.2 addressed in Johnson. (Barrier v. Leeds, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 685, fn. 2, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97, 13 P.3d 704.)"   Perez-Torres v. State 42 Cal.4th 136 (2007)

A FEW OF MANY CITING CASES: [This is a crucial principle, more cases will be added]

The scope of the discretionary act immunity `should be no greater than is required to give legislative and executive policymakers sufficient breathing space in which to perform their vital policymaking functions.'[Citation]"Salazar v. Upland Police Department Court of Appeal, 4th Dist., Div. 2 (2004)

For immunity to apply, the defendants must show that the decisions in question are properly considered as " `basic policy decisions "made at the" planning "stage of [the entity's] operations,'" rather than "routine duties incident to the normal operations" of the employee's office or position." Taylor v. City of Los Angeles 144 Cal.App.4th 1216