California does not apply Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services respondeat superior immunity.

The Case:  Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F. 3d 1007 (9th Circuit 2002) (en banc)

The case arises out of a police seizure at gunpoint of an apparently unarmed individual suspected of having earlier used a shotgun to shoot two dogs.

Robinson filed a civil action in federal court alleging both state and federal claims against the individual officers and Solano County. Partial summary judgments were granted (1) as to all claims against Solano County; (2) as to all state law claims against the individual defendants. The district judge declined summary judgment on the § 1983 excessive force claim against the police officers, to which the parties stipulated to a jury trial.

The jury found that the length of Robinson's detention was reasonable, were split on whether the force employed to seize Robinson was reasonable. However, the district court granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law regardin the use of excessive force under a Rule 50. Held, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Robinson appealed. The appellate court found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the federal excessive force claim, and reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment on the state-law torts.

The 9th Circuit opted for a hearing en banc, stating...

"We took this case en banc in order to clarify the law of the circuit regarding excessive force that violates the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, and to clarify the law of the circuit on the scope of qualified immunity for excessive force claims."

The result:  The court reversed
The district court applied the rule set out in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), that a county cannot be liable for employees' unconstitutional conduct on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

The en banc decision reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the state law claims against both the individual officers and Solano County.

 

California, however, has rejected the Monell rule and imposes liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees; it grants immunity to counties only where the public employee would also be immune. See Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2; see also Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 139-40, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 643 (1994) ("Under Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), the County is liable for acts and omissions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior to the same extent as a private employer. Under subdivision (b), the County is immune from liability if, and only if, [the employee] is immune.") (emphasis omitted); White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal.App.3d 566, 570, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985) ("in governmental tort cases, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under California law, the county's immunity depends upon whether the police officers are immune. Most of the state law claims arise from the allegation that the individual officers used excessive force, and California denies immunity to police officers who use excessive force in arresting a suspect.

See Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 215, 285 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341 (1991) ("[A] governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a police officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or engages in assaultive conduct."); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256, 264, 60 Cal.Rptr. 355 (1967) ("California cases have consistently held that a peace officer making an arrest is liable to the person arrested for using unreasonable force."). Public employees are similarly not entitled to immunity in suits for false arrest or false imprisonment. See Cal. Gov't Code § 820.4. Accordingly, the officers are not immune from suit under California law, and neither is Solano County.

We therefore .